Conventional wisdom and ideologies hold that responsibility for the partition of the Republic of Cyprus in the wake of Turkey's multiple advances on the island in summer 1974 rests on domestic ethnic and religious tensions between Turks and Greeks. This book, drawing on a wealth of archival material, shows that this is not the case at all. As the detailed report of the United Nations mediator, Galo Plaza, had shown in 1965, Turks and Greeks on the island could easily co-exist if left alone to determine their future. This did not happen. The partition of the island had been inscribed in NATO's policy since the 1950s, rewarding the strongest component of NATO's southern flank, Turkey, at the expense of Greece, the weaker component. The volume details the role of CIA agents in Greece and the machinations of the Greek junta of Demetrios Ioannides to overthrow the charismatic leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, who had been fighting for an independent and non-aligned Cyprus. It also explains how the partition of Cyprus in 1974 has opened up prospects for the partition of the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey, with Greece's eastern Aegean islands becoming 'NATOlands' in the service of the war against Russia.
The volume is an essential read for researchers and students in the history and politics of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and south-eastern Europe.